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Abstract:	  The	  rise	  of	  Euroskeptic	  or	  anti-­‐European	  Union	  (EU)	  parties	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (EP)	  has	  been	  popularly	  attributed	  to	  citizens’	  frustrations	  with	  economic	  stagnation	  and	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐touch,	  pro-­‐EU	  political	  elite.	  The	  EU’s	  defenders	  have,	  in	  turn,	  argued	  that	  policies	  promoted	  by	  anti-­‐EU	  parties,	  such	  as	  leaving	  the	  euro	  or	  rolling	  back	  the	  EU’s	  single	  market,	  are	  economically	  irrational	  due	  to	  the	  deep	  interdependence	  of	  EU	  economies.	  Do	  voters	  actually	  perceive	  their	  national	  economy	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  that	  of	  the	  EU,	  and	  do	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  fare	  better	  or	  worse	  in	  countries	  where	  such	  a	  linkage	  is	  more	  extensively	  perceived?	  This	  paper	  examines	  the	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  contours	  of	  Euroskepticism	  in	  EP	  elections,	  and	  assesses	  the	  possible	  effects	  of	  publically	  perceived	  economic	  interdependence	  on	  these	  election	  results.	  The	  paper	  ultimately	  aims	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  EU’s	  popular	  legitimacy	  and	  the	  status	  of	  Robert	  Schuman’s	  goal	  to	  attain	  “concrete	  achievements	  which…create	  a	  de	  facto	  solidarity.”	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The	  serial	  crises	  buffeting	  Europe—including	  financial	  and	  economic	  instability,	  intercommunal	  violence,	  military	  conflict	  on	  its	  borders,	  and	  a	  possible	  “Grexit”—are	  sufficiently	  grave	  that	  some	  have	  questioned	  the	  European	  Union’s	  (EU’s)	  capacity	  to	  recover	  (e.g.,	  Hansen	  &	  Gordon	  2014).	  Popular	  discontent	  with	  EU	  policy	  responses	  to	  these	  challenges—observable	  both	  in	  recent	  national	  and	  EU	  elections	  as	  well	  as	  ongoing	  protests	  in	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  members	  alike—further	  sharpens	  questions	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  Union’s	  growing	  politicization.	  It	  would	  seem	  the	  time	  of	  functionalist	  integration—envisioned	  by	  Robert	  Schuman	  as	  political	  elites	  crafting	  “concrete	  achievements	  which…create	  a	  de	  facto	  solidarity,”	  aided	  by	  a	  “permissive	  consensus”	  among	  quiescent	  publics	  (Lindberg	  &	  Scheingold	  1970)—has	  passed.	  What	  is	  less	  clear	  is	  just	  how	  restrictive,	  or	  even	  threatening,	  the	  current	  “constraining	  dissensus”	  is	  to	  the	  European	  project	  (Hooghe	  &	  Marks	  2009;	  c.f.	  Schimmelfennig	  2014).	  	  The	  2014	  European	  Parliament	  (EP)	  elections,	  which	  were	  contested	  during	  a	  period	  of	  grinding	  (if	  variable)	  economic	  adversity	  and	  returned	  Euroskeptic	  parties	  to	  Strasbourg	  in	  record	  numbers,	  offer	  a	  particular	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  evaluate	  the	  politicization	  and	  ultimately	  the	  popular	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  This	  paper	  asks	  two	  related	  questions.	  First,	  how	  do	  we	  understand	  this	  outcome?	  One	  interpretation	  would	  be	  that	  voters	  are	  rejecting	  the	  EU’s	  policy	  solutions	  to	  its	  members’	  struggles,	  and	  maybe	  even	  the	  EU	  itself.	  Others	  have	  seen	  a	  silver	  lining	  in	  such	  results	  and	  in	  the	  EU’s	  politicization	  generally.	  I	  suggest	  the	  result	  can	  be	  interpreted	  to	  some	  extent	  as	  a	  popular	  acceptance	  of	  the	  EP	  as	  legitimate	  target	  of	  a	  European	  protest	  vote.	  	  	  The	  second	  question	  is	  what	  is	  driving	  the	  rise	  of	  Euroskeptic	  parties	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  The	  paper	  examines	  cross-­‐national	  data	  on	  EP	  voting	  over	  the	  past	  three	  European	  elections	  (2004,	  2009,	  2014),	  considering	  factors	  that	  might	  influence	  voting	  for	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐EU	  parties.	  In	  particular,	  it	  begins	  to	  examine	  a	  factor	  Ecker-­‐Ehrhardt	  (2012)	  associated	  with	  “cosmopolitan	  politicization”:	  voters’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  economic	  
indivisibility	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (and	  euro	  area).	  That	  is,	  do	  publics,	  like	  political	  elites,	  perceive	  supranational	  EU	  governance	  as	  necessary	  to	  manage	  extensive	  interdependence	  among	  member	  states	  (see	  Hooghe	  2003)—or	  do	  they	  perceive	  their	  country	  as	  economically	  “decoupled”	  from	  certain	  EU	  members	  or	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole?	  And	  if	  publics	  perceive	  their	  national	  economy	  to	  be	  tightly	  tied	  to	  that	  of	  the	  EU,	  do	  they	  tend	  to	  vote	  for	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  in	  the	  EP	  (and	  thus	  for	  a	  form	  of	  solidarity)	  or	  for	  anti-­‐EU	  parties	  (and	  thus	  to	  break	  free	  from	  the	  “chain	  gang”	  that	  might	  pull	  them	  over	  the	  cliff)?	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  should	  give	  us	  some	  insight	  into	  whether	  the	  European	  Union	  will	  “hang	  together”	  in	  its	  time	  of	  troubles	  more	  resolutely	  than	  pessimists	  might	  believe.	  	  
	  
European	  Parliament	  elections	  and	  the	  EU’s	  popular	  legitimacy	  The	  European	  Union’s	  current	  difficulties	  constitute	  a	  comprehensive	  challenge	  to	  both	  its	  output	  and	  input	  legitimacy.	  While	  disagreements	  regarding	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  austerity—and	  ultimately	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  EU’s	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  debt	  crisis—dominate	  headlines,	  the	  rise	  of	  anti-­‐EU	  parties	  and	  more	  general	  politicization	  of	  EU	  policymaking	  tap	  into	  a	  venerable	  debate	  about	  the	  Union’s	  input	  legitimacy.	  Academic	  and	  political	  commentators	  have	  long	  debated	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  EU’s	  democratic	  deficit,	  and	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some	  prescribe	  a	  stronger	  European	  Parliament	  as	  a	  solution	  thereto	  (see,	  among	  others,	  Risse	  2014;	  Majone	  2014,	  2005;	  Moravcsik	  2004,	  2012;	  Crum	  2012;	  Rodrik	  2011;	  Follesdal	  &	  Hix	  2006).	  This	  paper	  examines	  EP	  election	  outcomes	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  popular	  legitimacy—input	  and	  output	  legitimacy,	  as	  perceived	  by	  the	  voting	  public—of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  its	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  EU’s	  economic	  struggles	  in	  particular.	  	  
2014	  European	  Parliament	  elections	  outcomes	  in	  historical	  context	  If	  the	  2014	  European	  elections	  were	  a	  verdict	  on	  the	  European	  Union	  itself,	  the	  judgment	  would	  be	  a	  grim	  one.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1,	  Euroskeptic	  parties	  received	  over	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  vote,	  up	  from	  a	  post-­‐1979	  average	  of	  just	  below	  21	  percent	  (and	  about	  15	  percent	  in	  1990s	  and	  2000s);	  mainstream	  parties	  saw	  their	  share	  fall	  10	  points	  to	  69	  percent,	  almost	  six	  below	  their	  historical	  average.	  Far-­‐right	  nationalist	  parties	  did	  particularly	  well	  in	  2014,	  capturing	  19.2	  percent	  of	  the	  vote—up	  7.5	  percent	  from	  the	  2009	  European	  elections.	  At	  6	  percent,	  far-­‐left	  parties	  received	  their	  highest	  support	  since	  1999.	  	  
	  

















Figure	  1.	  European	  election	  results,	  1979-­2014	  
mainstream	  far	  left	  far	  right	  Non-­‐Iscrits	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candidates	  held	  a	  number	  of	  debates	  regarding	  European	  issues,	  including	  the	  merits	  of	  austerity	  and	  free	  trade	  talks	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  According	  to	  the	  Economist,	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  EPP	  “detected	  the	  emergence	  of	  pan-­‐European	  debates	  for	  the	  first	  time,”	  though	  polls	  in	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  suggested	  voters	  were	  not	  deeply	  influenced	  by	  these	  debates	  or	  the	  Spitzenkandidaten.2	  Indeed,	  Treib	  (2014)	  argues	  that,	  despite	  their	  reduced	  overall	  majority,	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  will	  seek	  to	  continue	  to	  sideline	  Euroskeptic	  parties—which	  could	  in	  turn	  induce	  an	  even	  stronger	  Euroskeptic	  backlash	  in	  the	  2019	  elections.	  	  
EP	  election	  outcomes	  and	  the	  EU’s	  popular	  legitimacy	  Why	  observe	  European	  Parliament	  election	  results	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  EU’s	  popular	  legitimacy?	  One	  goal	  is	  to	  sidestep	  the	  prescriptive	  quality	  of	  the	  democratic	  deficit	  debate,	  wherein	  more	  EP	  authority	  “solves”	  (or	  not)	  the	  problem.3	  More	  importantly,	  by	  evaluating	  EP	  election	  results	  as	  snapshots	  of	  general	  public	  attitudes	  (as	  opposed	  to	  voting	  behavior)	  we	  address	  the	  essential	  question	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  “governance	  beyond	  the	  nation-­‐state.”	  	  The	  European	  Union	  is	  a	  special	  case	  of	  supranational	  governance	  in	  part	  because	  the	  interaction	  of—and	  perhaps	  tradeoff	  between	  (see	  Crum	  2012)—uniquely	  high	  levels	  of	  supranational	  authority	  and	  democratic	  governance.	  While	  occasional	  referenda	  on	  EU	  treaties	  offer	  ad	  hoc,	  country-­‐specific	  insights	  into	  public	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  EU,	  EP	  elections	  offer	  regular,	  EU-­‐wide	  indicators	  thereof.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  why	  EP	  voting	  is	  not	  just	  a	  possible	  indicator	  of	  public	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  EU,	  but	  an	  important—and	  valid—one.	  	  The	  main	  reason	  to	  be	  cautious	  in	  interpreting	  results	  of	  EP	  elections	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  public	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  EU	  or	  its	  policy	  regimes	  is	  that	  they	  might	  be	  “second-­‐order	  elections”—indicative	  of	  voters’	  relative	  satisfaction	  with	  national	  rather	  than	  EU-­‐wide	  leadership	  and	  broader	  political	  and	  economic	  conditions	  (Reif	  &	  Schmitt	  1980;	  Hix	  &	  Marsh	  2007).	  This	  claim	  cannot	  simply	  be	  dismissed.	  EP	  elections	  still	  tend	  to	  go	  well	  for	  Europarties	  whose	  national	  affiliates	  are	  popular	  at	  home	  and	  poorly	  for	  those	  that	  are	  not,	  and	  turnout	  remains	  lower	  than	  most	  parliamentary	  elections	  within	  the	  member	  states.	  	  Focusing	  on	  low	  turnout	  in	  EP	  elections,	  however,	  obscures	  two	  key	  points.	  First,	  turnout—42.5	  percent	  overall	  in	  2014,	  ranging	  from	  90	  percent	  in	  Belgium	  to	  13	  percent	  in	  Slovakia—is	  not	  significantly	  lower	  than	  in	  other	  comparable	  democracies	  (Corbett	  2014).	  Turnout	  in	  US	  Congressional	  elections	  in	  2014	  were	  36.4	  percent.	  As	  Kriesi	  (2012)	  notes,	  voters	  use	  all	  elections—European,	  national,	  or	  local—to	  register	  their	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  general	  political,	  economic,	  or	  other	  conditions.	  Second,	  from	  a	  methodological	  perspective,	  voting	  is	  a	  costly	  signaling	  mechanism	  for	  citizens	  and	  thus	  potentially	  more	  representative	  of	  “true	  opinion”	  than	  opinion	  surveys.	  Because	  voting	  is	  more	  costly	  responding	  to	  survey	  questions,	  election	  results	  may	  well	  be	  a	  more	  valid	  indicator	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Economist,	  “The	  will	  to	  power,”	  4	  October	  2014.	  3	  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  greater	  authority	  for	  the	  European	  Parliament	  increases	  or	  decreases	  the	  EU’s	  democratic	  deficit	  if	  this	  authority	  is	  shifted	  upward	  from	  national	  parliaments,	  as	  opposed	  to	  horizontally	  from	  the	  European	  Council	  or	  European	  Commission.	  See	  Winzen	  et	  al.	  2015.	  Fogarty	  &	  Wallsten	  2013	  question	  whether	  supranational	  institutions	  are	  the	  best	  focus	  for	  measuring	  the	  EU’s	  democratic	  deficit.	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public	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  policies	  than	  Eurobarometer,	  European	  Social	  Survey,	  and	  Pew	  polls	  (which	  may	  have	  response	  rates	  lower	  than	  EP	  election	  turnout).	  	  More	  importantly,	  EP	  elections	  may	  offer	  a	  valid	  indicator	  of	  public	  perceptions	  of	  both	  EU	  policies	  and	  its	  authority	  overall.4	  Common	  arguments	  reinforcing	  the	  second-­‐order	  election	  perspective	  focus	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  single	  European	  demos5	  or	  “public	  sphere”	  (Schlessinger	  1999;	  Follesdal	  2014)	  to	  truly	  Europeanize	  national	  political	  dynamics.6	  Yet	  as	  several	  scholars	  have	  noted,	  the	  increasing	  politicization	  of	  the	  EU	  may	  transform	  simultaneous	  national	  elections	  into	  something	  more	  like	  a	  single	  European	  poll.	  The	  EU	  issue	  voting	  approach	  posits	  that	  EP	  elections	  increasingly	  reflect	  popular	  opinion	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  European	  integration	  as	  opposed	  to	  national	  issues	  (see,	  for	  example,	  de	  Vries	  et	  al.	  2011),	  and	  votes	  that	  seem	  to	  punish	  national	  governments	  might	  reflect	  voters’	  discontent	  with	  national	  governments’	  agreement	  to	  certain	  European	  policies	  (Treib	  2014).	  Indeed,	  in	  a	  highly	  integrated	  EU	  (and	  especially	  euro	  area),	  both	  empirically	  and	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  voters,	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  “national”	  and	  “European”	  policies	  may	  be	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  discern.	  	  	  The	  euro	  crisis	  intensified	  the	  connection	  between	  growing	  EU	  authority	  and	  politicization.	  As	  Kern	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  argue,	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  action	  in	  much	  of	  Europe	  may	  be	  shifting	  from	  “civil	  participation”	  to	  “grievance	  participation,”	  with	  communal	  grievances	  (such	  as	  those	  held	  by	  citizens	  of	  either	  “debtor”	  or	  “creditor”	  countries)	  shared	  across	  borders.	  From	  a	  broader	  perspective,	  Zürn	  and	  his	  collaborators	  (Zürn	  et	  al.	  2012;	  de	  Wilde	  &	  Zürn	  2012)	  argue	  that,	  like	  with	  other	  international	  institutions,	  politicization	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  caused	  primarily	  by	  the	  growing	  scope	  of	  its	  authority—which	  in	  the	  EU	  has	  increased	  significantly	  with	  new	  fiscal	  and	  financial	  regimes	  adopted	  during	  the	  euro	  crisis.	  	  	  Politicization	  has	  hampered	  functionalist	  EU	  integration	  and	  ushered	  in	  a	  constraining	  dissensus	  (Hooghe	  &	  Marks	  2009).	  Yet,	  as	  Risse	  (2014)	  has	  argued,	  politicization	  might	  spur	  development	  of	  a	  European	  demos	  and	  public	  sphere.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  citizens	  feel	  
European	  grievances	  as	  a	  result	  of	  increasingly	  authoritative	  EU	  institutions’	  policy	  choices,	  they	  may	  increasingly	  view	  EP	  elections	  as	  the	  appropriate	  mechanism	  to	  hold	  European	  (versus	  national)	  elites	  accountable	  for	  European	  policies—and,	  especially	  if	  they	  support	  far-­‐right	  parties,	  to	  promote	  renationalization	  of	  certain	  policy	  areas.	  Thus	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  treat	  European	  Parliament	  elections	  as	  “first-­‐order”	  elections	  that	  reflect	  public	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  EU,	  its	  leaders,	  and	  the	  supranational	  policy	  regimes	  they	  pursue.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Like	  de	  Wilde	  &	  Zürn	  (2012,	  140),	  who	  address	  politicization	  in	  terms	  of	  “reactions	  to	  the	  EU	  policies	  and	  the	  polity,”	  I	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  distinguish	  here	  between	  public	  attitudes	  toward	  EU	  policies	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  overall	  EU	  authority	  on	  the	  other.	  	  5	  See	  the	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy’s	  special	  issue	  on	  “demoi-­‐ocracy”	  in	  the	  EU	  (22,	  1,	  January	  2015).	  6	  Abborno	  &	  Zapryanova	  (2013)	  show	  how	  elite	  messaging	  at	  the	  national	  level	  can	  capitalize	  on	  (and	  reinforce)	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  European	  public	  sphere.	  They	  argue	  that	  publics	  are	  highly	  responsive	  to	  Euroskeptic	  messages	  from	  political	  elites,	  whether	  these	  messages	  emphasize	  “cultural	  threat”	  (particularly	  from	  immigration)	  or	  the	  democratic	  deficit	  (and	  the	  loss	  of	  national,	  popular	  sovereignty).	  This	  claim	  mirrors	  that	  of	  Frank	  (2004)	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  American	  context.	  Frank	  argued	  Republican	  Party	  elites,	  though	  messaging,	  caused	  middle	  class	  and	  lower-­‐middle	  class	  Kansans	  to	  vote	  against	  their	  economic	  interests.	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Explaining	  public	  support	  for	  EU	  authority	  How	  do	  we	  account	  for	  over-­‐time	  and	  cross-­‐national	  variation	  in	  EP	  voting	  outcomes?	  Here	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  connect	  literatures	  addressing	  general	  public	  support	  for	  the	  EU	  and	  specific	  voting	  behavior,	  distinguishing	  between	  approaches	  emphasizing	  economic	  versus	  non-­‐economic	  factors.	  	  A	  longstanding	  approach	  emphasizing	  economic	  conditions	  claims	  that	  citizens’	  relative	  support	  for	  EU	  integration	  reflects	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  serves	  their	  economic	  interests.	  Rational	  voters	  are	  expected	  to	  reward	  political	  leaders	  when	  the	  economy	  is	  good	  and	  punish	  them	  when	  it	  is	  bad,	  whether	  at	  the	  local,	  national,	  or	  European	  level.	  This	  expectation	  undergirds	  neofunctionalism’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  “permissive	  consensus”	  for	  European	  integration:	  generally	  improving	  economic	  conditions	  lead	  the	  public	  to	  acquiesce	  to	  EU	  integration	  initiatives,	  and	  integration	  slows	  when	  economic	  conditions	  are	  more	  adverse	  (Lindberg	  &	  Scheingold	  1970,	  Eichenberg	  &	  Dalton	  1993,	  2008).7	  Thus	  we	  should	  expect	  EP	  elections	  to	  tilt	  toward	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  (especially	  incumbent	  ones)	  during	  times	  of	  broad-­‐based	  economic	  expansion	  and	  against	  such	  parties	  during	  economic	  downturns.	  	  Among	  noneconomic	  factors,	  the	  status	  of	  European	  (versus	  national-­‐only)	  identity	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  and	  a	  collective	  European	  demos	  may	  also	  drive	  public	  support	  for	  the	  European	  Union.	  Some	  leading	  scholars	  argue	  (or	  strongly	  imply)	  individuals	  indicating	  some	  sense	  of	  European	  identity	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  EU	  integration	  generally	  (Risse	  2014,	  2003;	  Stoeckel	  2012;	  Habermas	  1991).	  The	  nature	  of	  “strong”	  national	  identities	  may	  also	  affect	  support	  for	  the	  European	  Union:	  Hooghe	  &	  Marks	  (2004)	  demonstrated	  that	  individuals	  with	  a	  “positive”	  sense	  of	  national	  identity	  also	  tended	  to	  support	  European	  integration,	  while	  those	  with	  a	  “national-­‐only”	  identity—i.e.,	  denying	  any	  identification	  with	  Europe—tended	  toward	  Euroskepticism	  (see	  also	  Ecker-­‐Ehrhardt	  2014).	  Thus	  the	  broad	  expectation	  emerging	  from	  this	  literature	  is	  that	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  should	  fare	  better	  where	  and	  when	  levels	  of	  identification	  with	  the	  EU	  is	  comparatively	  higher.	  	  Others	  have	  put	  forth	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  “contact	  hypothesis”:	  longer	  or	  more	  intensive	  exposure	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  should	  increase	  public	  support	  for	  it	  (see	  Niedermayer	  &	  Sinnott	  1995).	  Addressing	  international	  institutions	  generally,	  Ecker-­‐Ehrhardt	  (2014:	  8-­‐9)	  argues,	  “societal	  actors…become	  more	  positive	  about	  international	  governance	  as	  the	  scope	  of	  international	  governance	  to	  which	  they	  are	  exposed	  widens.”	  From	  this	  perspective,	  two	  distinct	  expectations	  emerge:	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  should	  increase	  as	  the	  EU’s	  authority	  increases,	  and	  citizens	  of	  more	  longstanding	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  should	  be	  more	  supportive	  of	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  than	  those	  of	  newer	  members.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  A	  major	  strand	  of	  the	  International	  Political	  Economy	  literature	  takes	  a	  more	  micro-­‐level	  approach	  to	  societal	  preferences	  regarding	  international	  economic	  integration,	  emphasizing	  splits	  between	  labor	  and	  capital	  (Rogowski	  1989)	  or	  between	  export-­‐oriented	  and	  import-­‐competing	  sectors	  (Frieden	  1991).	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Economic	  indivisibility	  At	  this	  incipient	  stage,	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  test	  the	  above	  hypotheses,	  but	  rather	  uses	  them	  to	  define	  the	  ground	  for	  an	  alternative	  claim:	  that	  public	  support	  for	  the	  EU	  is	  shaped	  by	  citizens’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  their	  national	  (and	  personal)	  economic	  circumstances	  cannot	  be	  “decoupled”	  from	  that	  of	  their	  European	  partners.	  This	  approach	  implies	  a	  community	  built	  less	  on	  shared	  communal	  identities	  than	  on	  a	  shared	  perception	  of	  economic	  common	  fate—which	  Theiler	  (2012)	  called	  “instrumental	  loyalties”	  and	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  economic	  indivisibility	  (see	  Fogarty	  2011).	  	  The	  specific	  effect	  of	  economic	  indivisibility	  on	  support	  for	  the	  EU	  and	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  is	  currently	  held	  to	  be	  indeterminate.	  Citizens	  perceiving	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  indivisibility	  may	  support	  more	  intensive	  supranational	  management	  of	  economic	  interdependence,	  and	  thus	  support	  mainstream	  pro-­‐EU	  parties.	  Alternatively,	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  indivisibility	  may	  cause	  citizens	  to	  seek	  separation—to	  support	  nationalist	  parties	  that	  aim	  to	  renationalize	  policymaking	  authority,	  limiting	  or	  reducing	  vulnerability	  to	  externalities	  from	  other	  Europeans’	  policy	  choices.	  	  	  Indivisibility—the	  impossibility	  of	  dividing	  the	  constituent	  parts	  of	  an	  integrated	  whole—is,	  like	  solidarity,	  a	  term	  with	  great	  rhetorical	  value	  but	  lacking	  conceptual	  clarity.	  Ruggie	  (1993)	  was	  among	  first	  to	  specify	  indivisibility	  in	  a	  multilateral	  governance	  context,	  claiming	  that	  multilateral	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  NATO	  were	  built	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  indivisibility	  of	  security	  in	  the	  postwar	  world.8	  He	  argued	  that	  indivisibility	  was	  “a	  social	  construction,	  not	  a	  technical	  condition:	  in	  a	  collective	  security	  scheme,	  states	  behave	  as	  if	  peace	  were	  indivisible	  and	  thereby	  make	  it	  so.”	  	  Economic	  indivisibility	  is	  thus	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  common	  economic	  fate,	  one	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  positive	  or	  negative.	  The	  positive	  perception	  would	  induce	  solidarity:	  the	  belief	  that	  citizens	  of	  Europe	  cannot	  enjoy	  economic	  security	  unless	  all	  those	  within	  the	  community	  do,	  and	  thus	  mutual	  assistance	  must	  occur	  during	  times	  of	  distress.	  The	  negative	  perception	  would	  follow	  the	  logic	  of	  a	  chain	  gang:	  the	  belief	  that	  firm	  ties	  to	  distant	  others	  increases	  one’s	  vulnerability	  to	  threats	  encountered	  (or	  initiated)	  by	  others	  in	  the	  gang.	  What	  connects	  these	  divergent	  vectors	  of	  indivisibility	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  European	  citizens	  have	  an	  underlying	  sense	  of	  economic	  vulnerability—that	  economic	  security	  is	  fragile,	  and	  threats	  exist	  either	  “out	  there”	  (inducing	  solidaristic	  responses)	  or	  “in	  here”	  (inducing	  chain	  gang	  responses).	  	  	  Essential	  to	  this	  conception	  of	  perceived	  common	  fate	  is	  the	  actual	  level	  of	  economic	  interdependence	  among	  European	  countries.	  Liberal	  and	  neofunctionalist	  theories	  posit	  that	  economic	  interdependence	  gives	  states	  incentives	  to	  sustain	  institutions	  that	  can	  manage	  interdependencies	  to	  mutual	  benefit	  (Keohane	  1998;	  Stone	  Sweet	  &	  Sandholtz	  1998;	  Schimmelfennig	  2014).	  Yet	  as	  others	  (e.g.,	  Milward	  1993;	  Moravcsik	  1998)	  have	  shown,	  economic	  interdependence	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  European	  governments	  to	  choose	  to	  increase	  supranational	  economic	  management.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Prior	  to	  Ruggie,	  Deutsch	  et	  al.	  1957	  articulated	  the	  concept	  of	  “we-­‐feeling”	  that	  comes	  closer	  to	  an	  identity-­‐oriented	  community	  than	  “instrumental	  loyalties.”	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  Hooghe	  (2003)	  offered	  an	  essential	  empirical	  insight	  into	  distinctions	  between	  elite	  and	  public	  views	  of	  the	  EU’s	  role	  in	  managing	  mutual	  vulnerability.	  Whereas	  mainstream	  political	  elites	  tend	  to	  support	  European	  integration	  to	  manage	  interdependence	  and	  resulting	  policy	  externalities,	  European	  publics	  prefer	  European	  integration	  that	  sustains	  the	  welfare	  state—i.e.,	  are	  focused	  on	  preserving	  existing	  national	  protections,	  rather	  than	  managing	  mutual	  sensitivity	  at	  the	  European	  level.	  Thus	  an	  increase	  in	  a	  positive	  sense	  of	  indivisibility	  among	  these	  publics	  would	  imply	  a	  convergence	  toward	  elite	  attitudes	  regarding	  the	  rationale	  for	  supranational	  economic	  management	  and	  perhaps	  a	  looser	  popular	  constraint	  in	  the	  EU’s	  “constraining	  dissensus.”	  An	  increase	  in	  a	  negative	  sense	  of	  indivisibility	  would	  imply	  divergence	  from	  elites	  and	  a	  turn	  toward	  Euroskepticism,	  based	  on	  fears	  that	  “European”	  problems	  (whether	  the	  euro	  crisis,	  immigration,	  or	  other	  status	  quo-­‐upsetting	  dynamics)	  could	  undermine	  valued	  national	  protective	  structures.	  	  Ecker-­‐Ehrhardt’s	  (2012,	  2014)	  work	  on	  “cosmopolitan	  politicization”	  offers	  a	  clue	  as	  to	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  economic	  indivisibility	  induces	  support	  for	  pro-­‐	  v.	  anti-­‐EU	  parties.	  Ecker-­‐Ehrhardt	  demonstrates	  that	  rises	  in	  supranational	  institutions’	  authority	  (or	  “institutional	  gravity”)	  tend	  to	  induce	  politicization	  (see	  also	  Zürn	  et	  al.	  2012),	  and	  that	  this	  politicization	  has	  particular	  effects	  on	  the	  European	  electoral	  arena.	  In	  his	  study	  of	  German	  citizens’	  attitudes,	  Ecker-­‐Ehrhardt	  (2012)	  found	  that	  people	  may,	  “believe	  that	  international	  institutions	  are	  desirable	  because	  of	  their	  superior	  capacity	  to	  solve	  transnational	  problems.”	  More	  specifically,	  he	  claims,	  German	  citizens’	  perceptions	  of	  transnational	  interdependencies	  (in	  terms	  of	  functional	  sensitivity	  as	  well	  as	  moral	  commitments)	  foster	  beliefs	  in	  the	  capacity	  of	  international	  institutions	  to	  solve	  problems.	  Remarkably,	  this	  relationship	  is	  moderated	  by	  citizens’	  sense	  of	  their	  own	  vulnerability,	  that	  is,	  their	  beliefs	  that	  the	  national	  government	  is	  incapable	  of	  solving	  such	  problems.	  (481)	  In	  turn,	  Ecker-­‐Ehrhardt	  (2014)	  found	  that	  one	  element	  of	  politicization,	  (national)	  political	  parties’	  adoption	  of	  platforms	  regarding	  international	  institutions,	  reflects	  these	  institutions’	  growing	  authority	  and	  the	  increasing	  salience	  of	  this	  fact	  for	  the	  public—and	  dissent	  from	  citizens	  with	  an	  exclusive	  national	  identity.	  Following	  Ecker-­‐Ehrhardt’s	  logic,	  we	  should	  expect	  publics	  with	  greater	  perceptions	  of	  economic	  indivisibility	  to	  offer	  greater	  support	  to	  pro-­‐EU	  parties,	  except	  in	  places	  where	  a	  national-­‐only	  identity	  is	  strongest.	  	  	  
	  
Interdependence,	  indivisibility,	  and	  EP	  election	  results,	  2004-­2014	  An	  initial	  presentation	  of	  descriptive	  data	  here	  aims	  to	  do	  three	  things.	  First,	  it	  establishes	  a	  baseline	  for	  actual	  economic	  interdependence	  over	  the	  last	  decade,	  demonstrating	  a	  mixed	  picture	  in	  which	  some	  decoupling	  seems	  to	  be	  occurring.	  Second,	  it	  presents	  an	  initial	  measure	  of	  economic	  indivisibility	  among	  citizens	  of	  the	  EU27,	  based	  on	  data	  drawn	  from	  the	  Eurobarometer.	  Third,	  it	  presents	  vote	  percentages	  for	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  over	  the	  last	  three	  European	  Parliament	  elections,	  and	  offers	  a	  few	  initial	  observations	  regarding	  a	  possible	  relationship	  with	  economic	  indivisibility.	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EU	  interdependence,	  2004-­2014	  Recently	  released	  fourth	  quarter	  2014	  data	  showed	  the	  two	  largest	  European	  economies,	  Germany	  and	  France,	  on	  divergent	  growth	  paths:	  the	  German	  economy	  expanded	  robustly,	  which	  the	  French	  economy	  stagnated.	  Is	  this	  reflective	  of	  a	  general	  decoupling	  of	  EU	  economies?	  Two	  indicators,	  GDP	  growth	  and	  intra-­‐EU	  trade,	  offer	  a	  mixed	  picture.9	  	  In	  an	  integrated	  European	  economy,	  one	  expectation	  is	  that	  the	  economic	  cycle	  affects	  member	  states’	  economies	  in	  similar	  ways.	  That	  is,	  while	  growth	  rates	  will	  necessarily	  vary	  based	  on	  different	  fundamentals,	  shared	  governance	  structures	  (especially	  in	  the	  euro	  area)	  as	  well	  as	  sensitivity	  to	  intra-­‐EU	  trade	  should	  cause	  economies	  to	  move	  in	  tandem.	  A	  snapshot	  of	  EU	  economic	  growth	  since	  2004	  suggests	  decoupling	  has	  been	  limited.	  	  
Table	  1.	  GDP	  growth	  in	  Europe,	  2004-­201410	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	  Belgium	  	   3.4	   1.9	   2.6	   3.0	   1.0	   -­‐2.6	   2.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.6	  	   0.1	   0.3	   1.0	  Bulgaria	   6.6	   6.0	   6.5	   6.9	   5.8	   -­‐5.0	   0.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.0	   0.5	   1.1	   n/a	  	  	  Czech	  Rep	   4.9	   6.4	   6.9	   5.5	   2.7	   -­‐4.8	   2.3	   2.0	   -­‐0.8	   -­‐0.7	   2.2	  Denmark	   2.6	   2.4	   3.8	   0.8	   -­‐0.7	   -­‐5.1	   1.6	   1.2	   -­‐0.7	   -­‐0.5	   0.9	  	  Germany	   1.2	   0.7	   3.7	   3.3	   1.1	   -­‐5.6	   4.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.6	   0.4	   0.1	   1.6	  	  Estonia	   	   6.5	   9.5	   10.4	   7.9	   -­‐5.3	   -­‐14.7	   2.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	   8.3	   4.7	   1.6	   n/a	  	  Ireland	   	   4.6	   5.7	   5.5	   4.9	   -­‐2.6	   -­‐6.4	   -­‐0.3	   2.8	   -­‐0.3	   0.2	   n/a	  Greece	   	   5.0	   0.9	   5.8	   3.5	   -­‐0.4	   -­‐0.4	   -­‐5.4	   -­‐8.9	   -­‐6.6	   -­‐3.9	   0.8	  Spain	   	   3.2	   3.7	   4.2	   3.8	   1.1	   -­‐3.6	   0	   -­‐0.6	   -­‐2.1	   -­‐1.2	   1.3	  	  France	   	   2.8	   1.6	   2.4	   2.4	   0.2	   -­‐2.9	   2.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.1	   0.3	   0.3	   0.4	  	  Italy	   	   1.6	   0.9	   2.0	   1.5	   -­‐1.0	   -­‐5.5	   1.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.6	   -­‐2.3	   -­‐1.9	   n/a	  Cyprus	   	   4.4	   3.7	   4.5	   4.9	   3.6	   -­‐2.0	   1.4	  	  	  	  	  	   0.3	   -­‐2.4	   -­‐5.4	   n/a	  Latvia	   	   8.9	   1.6	   11.6	   9.8	   -­‐3.2	   -­‐14.2	   -­‐2.9	  	   5.0	   4.8	   4.2	   2.4	  Lithuania	   n/a	   0.9	   7.4	   11.1	   2.6	   -­‐14.8	   	  1.6	   6.1	   3.8	   3.3	   n/a	  Luxembourg	   4.9	   3.9	   4.9	   6.5	   0.5	   -­‐5.3	   	  5.1	   2.8	   -­‐0.2	   2.0	   n/a	  Hungary	   4.8	   10.2	   4.0	   0.5	   0.9	   -­‐6.6	   	  0.8	   1.8	   -­‐1.5	   1.5	   3.0	  Malta	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.4	   3.8	   1.8	   4.0	   3.3	   -­‐2.5	   	  3.5	   2.2	   2.5	   2.5	   n/a	  Netherlands	   1.9	   2.3	   3.8	   4.2	   2.1	   -­‐3.3	   	  1.1	   1.7	   -­‐1.6	   -­‐0.7	   0.8	  Austria	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.7	   2.1	   3.4	   3.6	   1.5	   -­‐3.8	   	  1.9	   3.1	   0.9	   0.2	   0.3	  Poland	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5.1	   3.5	   6.2	   7.2	   3.9	   2.6	   	  3.7	   4.8	   1.8	   1.7	   3.3	  Portugal	   1.8	   0.8	   1.6	   2.5	   0.2	   -­‐3.0	   	  1.9	   -­‐1.8	   -­‐3.3	   -­‐1.4	   n/a	  Romania	   8.4	   4.2	   8.1	   6.9	   8.5	   -­‐7.1	   -­‐0.8	   1.1	   0.6	   3.4	   n/a	  Slovenia	   4.4	   4.0	   5.7	   6.9	   3.3	   -­‐7.8	   	  1.2	   0.6	   -­‐2.6	   -­‐1.0	   n/a	  Slovakia	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5.2	   6.5	   8.3	   10.7	   5.4	   -­‐5.3	   	  4.8	   2.7	   1.6	   1.4	   n/a	  Finland	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3.9	   2.8	   4.1	   5.2	   0.7	   -­‐8.3	   	  3.0	   2.6	   -­‐1.4	   -­‐1.3	   n/a	  Sweden	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4.3	   2.8	   4.7	   3.4	   -­‐0.6	   -­‐5.2	   	  6.0	   2.7	   -­‐0.3	   1.3	   1.9	  UK	   	   2.5	   2.8	   3.0	   2.6	   -­‐0.3	   -­‐4.3	   	  1.9	   1.6	   0.7	   1.7	   2.6	  
EU	  average*	   2.5	   2.0	   3.4	   3.1	   0.5	   -­4.4	   2.1	   1.7	   -­0.4	   0	  
Std	  deviation	  	  	  	  	  2.07	   2.45	   2.52	   2.81	   2.87	   3.98	   2.35	  	  	  	  	  	   2.96	   2.47	   2.13	  	  Two	  initial	  observations	  pertain	  here.	  First,	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  in	  2013	  was	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  2004,	  suggesting	  variability	  isn’t	  on	  an	  obvious	  upward	  trend.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  many	  other	  vectors	  of	  economic	  (and	  especially	  financial)	  interdependence	  among	  EU	  member	  states,	  such	  as	  capital	  investment,	  bank	  lending,	  and	  other	  financial	  flows.	  The	  focus	  on	  GDP	  growth	  and	  trade	  emphasizes	  the	  “real”	  economy,	  whose	  dynamics	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  felt	  by	  ordinary	  citizens.	  10	  Sources:	  World	  Bank,	  Eurostat,	  Economist.	  Note:	  EU	  average	  is	  for	  the	  EU28.	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Growing	  variability	  between	  2004	  and	  2008	  followed	  from	  higher	  growth	  rates—and	  thus	  convergence	  toward	  western	  living	  standards—in	  central	  and	  eastern	  European	  countries.	  The	  higher	  dispersion	  in	  2009	  reflects	  different	  depths	  of	  economic	  contraction	  during	  the	  nadir	  of	  the	  global	  recession,	  and	  in	  subsequent	  years	  is	  swollen	  by	  Greece’s	  struggles.	  Second,	  among	  the	  largest	  EU	  economies,	  Germany	  and	  France	  in	  2013	  were	  both	  close	  to	  the	  EU27	  mean	  (zero	  growth),	  while	  Italy	  and	  the	  UK	  were	  more	  divergent.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  Franco-­‐German	  connection	  is	  the	  most	  politically	  consequential,	  one	  will	  want	  to	  observe	  whether	  the	  end-­‐2014	  divergence	  is	  merely	  a	  blip	  or	  part	  of	  an	  emerging	  trend.	  	  	  
Table	  2.	  Intra-­EU	  exports	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  exports11	  	   	   2004	   	   2009	   	   2014	   	   change,	  2004-­‐2014	  Belgium	   77.1	   	   75.7	   	   70.1	   	   	   -­‐7.0	  Bulgaria	   n/a	   	   65.5	   	   60.1	   	   	   -­‐5.4	  Czech	  Rep	   87.7	   	   85.2	   	   81.1	   	   	   -­‐6.6	  Denmark	   70.8	   	   67.7	   	   63.5	   	   	   -­‐7.3	  Germany	   64.9	   	   62.6	   	   57.0	   	   	   -­‐7.9	  Estonia	  	   80.4	   	   69.5	   	   71.0	   	   	   -­‐9.3	  Ireland	  	   62.9	   	   61.2	   	   56.9	   	   	   -­‐6.0	  Greece	   	   66.9	   	   57.9	   	   46.6	   	   	   -­‐20.3	  Spain	   	   74.5	   	   69.9	   	   63.0	   	   	   -­‐11.5	  France	   	   66.1	   	   62.6	   	   59.3	   	   	   -­‐6.8	  Italy	   	   62.6	   	   58.4	   	   53.7	   	   	   -­‐8.9	  Cyprus	  	   67.5	   	   67.0	   	   58.0	   	   	   -­‐9.5	  Latvia	   	   77.4	   	   67.7	   	   66.4	   	   	   -­‐11.0	  Lithuania	   67.3	   	   64.4	   	   57.4	   	   	   -­‐9.9	  Luxembourg	   90.3	   	   87.3	   	   81.0	   	   	   -­‐9.2	  Hungary	   84.4	   	   80.2	   	   77.9	   	   	   -­‐6.5	  Malta	   	   49.4	   	   40.1	   	   42.6	   	   	   -­‐6.8	  Netherlands	   80.0	   	   77.5	   	   75.7	   	   	   -­‐4.3	  Austria	  	   74.9	   	   72.8	   	   70.0	   	   	   -­‐4.9	  Poland	  	   80.6	   	   79.9	   	   74.8	   	   	   -­‐5.8	  Portugal	   80.1	   	   75.4	   	   70.3	   	   	   -­‐9.8	  Romania	   n/a	   	   74.5	   	   69.6	   	   	   -­‐4.9	  Slovenia	   76.7	   	   77.0	   	   74.9	   	   	   -­‐1.8	  Slovakia	   87.2	   	   86.3	   	   83.0	   	   	   -­‐4.2	  Finland	  	   58.1	   	   55.7	   	   55.3	   	   	   -­‐2.8	  Sweden	   59.2	   	   58.5	   	   57.7	   	   	   -­‐1.5	  UK	   	   58.9	   	   55.1	   	   43.6	   	   	   -­‐15.3	  
Average	   72.2	   	   68.7	   	   64.5	   	   	   -­7.6	  	  Trends	  in	  intra-­‐EU	  trade	  (shown	  in	  Table	  2	  above	  in	  intra-­‐EU	  exports,	  focusing	  on	  EP	  election	  years),	  by	  contrast,	  suggest	  declining	  economic	  interdependence.	  Between	  2004	  and	  2013,	  intra-­‐EU	  exports	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  fell	  7.6	  percent—and,	  notably,	  declined	  in	  every	  single	  EU	  member	  state.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  unsurprising	  that	  intra-­‐EU	  exports	  fell	  the	  most	  in	  crisis-­‐hit	  countries	  such	  as	  Greece	  (-­‐20.3	  percent),	  Spain	  (-­‐11.5	  percent),	  and	  Portugal	  (-­‐9.8	  percent)—reflecting	  more	  general	  declines	  in	  economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Source:	  Eurostat.	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activity—more	  significant	  is	  Germany’s	  falling	  trade	  with	  EU	  member	  states,	  which	  at	  57	  percent	  of	  overall	  German	  exports	  is	  almost	  8	  percent	  lower	  than	  ten	  years	  ago	  and	  remains	  below	  the	  EU	  average.	  	  	  
European	  economic	  indivisibility,	  2009-­2014	  To	  what	  extent	  is	  the	  mixed	  picture	  of	  empirical	  trends	  in	  European	  interdependence	  matched	  by	  perceptions	  of	  indivisibility	  among	  citizens?	  Here	  only	  very	  initial	  observations	  are	  presented.	  	  The	  primary	  questions	  are	  the	  measurement	  of	  perceptions	  of	  interconnectedness	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  data	  to	  capture	  this	  measure.	  An	  initial	  measurement	  assumption	  draws	  on	  the	  economic	  voting	  literature:	  citizens’	  relative	  support	  for	  incumbent	  leaders	  reflects	  a	  perception	  the	  health	  of	  the	  national	  economy	  more	  than	  their	  personal	  financial	  status.	  As	  such,	  I	  have	  developed	  a	  measure	  of	  indivisibility	  that	  compares	  people’s	  perceptions	  of	  the	  health	  of	  the	  national	  economy	  to	  that	  of	  the	  European	  economy.	  The	  data	  come	  from	  the	  Eurobarometer	  public	  opinion	  surveys,	  which	  ask	  respondents,	  “How	  would	  you	  judge	  the	  situation	  of”	  (i.e.,	  good	  or	  bad)	  the	  national	  and	  European	  economies.	  Figure	  2	  below	  depicts	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  perceived	  “situations”	  in	  the	  EP	  election	  years	  of	  2009	  and	  2014.	  A	  smaller	  gap	  (as	  in	  Estonia)	  indicates	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  indivisibility,	  which	  a	  larger	  gap	  (as	  in	  Sweden)	  indicates	  lower	  indivisibility.	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Figure	  2.	  Economic	  indivisibility:	  perceived	  economic	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A	  few	  caveats	  are	  in	  order	  before	  attempting	  to	  interpret	  these	  data.	  First,	  Eurobarometer	  surveys	  have	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  appropriate	  questions	  to	  evaluate	  the	  robustness	  of	  this	  measure.	  A	  comparison	  of	  perceptions	  of	  whether	  the	  national	  and	  EU	  economies	  were	  “moving	  in	  the	  right	  direction”	  produced	  lower	  average	  gaps	  and	  standard	  deviations,	  but	  their	  year-­‐to-­‐year	  variation	  tracked	  that	  of	  the	  main	  indivisibility	  measure.	  Second,	  the	  Eurobarometer	  did	  not	  include	  questions	  about	  the	  current	  economic	  situation	  in	  their	  country	  or	  the	  EU	  until	  2006,	  making	  it	  impossible	  to	  include	  indivisibility	  data	  for	  the	  2004	  election	  year.	  So,	  to	  give	  a	  fuller	  picture	  of	  over-­‐time	  change	  in	  indivisibility	  than	  that	  presented	  in	  Figure	  2,	  Table	  3	  below	  shows	  annual	  scores	  for	  each	  member	  state	  during	  2006-­‐2014.	  	  
Table	  3.	  Economic	  indivisibility,	  2006-­2014	  	   	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	   avg,	  2006-­‐14	  Belgium	   2	   4	   3	   4	   1	   7	   7	   13	   6	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.9	  Bulgaria	   n/a	   43	   40	   37	   39	   31	   36	   42	   55	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40.4	  Czech	  Rep	   27	   26	   12	   10	   11	   4	   10	   14	   7	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.4	  Denmark	   15	   17	   16	   14	   14	   34	   35	   37	   40	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24.7	  Germany	   10	   2	   2	   1	   32	   47	   48	   45	   43	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27.6	  Estonia	  	   1	   10	   17	   17	   11	   9	   3	   7	   0	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.3	  Ireland	  	   14	   10	   4	   5	   14	   0	   3	   6	   2	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.4	  Greece	   	   47	   40	   14	   13	   11	   16	   15	   21	   27	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22.7	  Spain	   	   4	   7	   3	   8	   7	   2	   11	   14	   13	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7.7	  France	   	   12	   17	   8	   4	   4	   1	   0	   7	   9	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7.6	  Italy	   	   16	   18	   0	   3	   5	   2	   1	   4	   8	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.3	  Cyprus	  	   12	   1	   20	   10	   5	   0	   9	   15	   17	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.9	  Latvia	   	   51	   46	   33	   43	   41	   24	   25	   30	   27	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35.6	  Lithuania	   32	   44	   37	   40	   46	   24	   28	   33	   32	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35.1	  Luxembourg	   20	   24	   25	   30	   43	   58	   48	   42	   41	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36.8	  Hungary	   56	   48	   27	   18	   17	   9	   13	   15	   22	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25.0	  Malta	   	   23	   3	   10	   0	   5	   20	   27	   35	   27	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16.7	  Netherlands	   15	   11	   10	   5	   22	   39	   21	   6	   20	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16.6	  Austria	  	   8	   9	   17	   12	   23	   36	   32	   27	   15	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.9	  Poland	  	   52	   30	   17	   15	   12	   1	   10	   16	   12	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18.3	  Portugal	   40	   13	   3	   40	   1	   0	   1	   6	   15	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.2	  Romania	   n/a	   38	   30	   28	   37	   25	   23	   33	   37	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31.4	  Slovenia	   18	   18	   3	   11	   19	   9	   19	   28	   30	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17.2	  Slovakia	   43	   24	   8	   21	   17	   3	   8	   14	   24	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18.0	  Finland	  	   11	   12	   22	   4	   23	   43	   34	   16	   4	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18.8	  Sweden	   22	   18	   19	   16	   60	   77	   65	   65	   57	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44.3	  UK	   	   16	   6	   17	   2	   2	   8	   13	   16	   26	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11.8	  
EU	  average	   22.7	   20.0	   14.9	   15.2	   19.3	   19.5	   20.2	   22.5	   22.8	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.9	  
St	  deviation	   16.4	   14.7	   11.5	   13.0	   15.9	   20.4	   16.5	   15.1	   15.5	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11.4	  	  A	  few	  observations	  can	  be	  made	  about	  over-­‐time	  and	  cross-­‐national	  variation	  in	  indivisibility.	  As	  the	  EU	  averages	  show,	  financial	  and	  economic	  struggles	  after	  2009	  seem	  to	  have	  reversed	  an	  initial	  convergence	  on	  higher	  levels	  of	  indivisibility.	  In	  all	  but	  a	  few	  member	  states,	  the	  gap	  in	  2014	  was	  higher—in	  some	  cases,	  much	  higher—than	  in	  2009.	  The	  highest	  gaps	  (and	  thus	  lowest	  indivisibility)	  were	  primarily	  among	  countries	  in	  central	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and	  eastern	  Europe—countries	  that	  either	  do	  not	  use	  the	  euro	  or	  adopted	  it	  only	  within	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  years.12	  There	  is	  some	  differentiation	  after	  2011	  in	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  countries:	  crisis-­‐beset	  countries	  Greece,	  Portugal,	  Slovenia,	  and	  Cyprus	  saw	  declining	  indivisibility,	  while	  creditors	  Finland,	  Austria,	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  bucked	  the	  overall	  trend	  with	  higher	  or	  rising	  indivisibility.	  	  	  Two	  member	  states	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  this	  creditor-­‐debtor	  differentiation,	  Ireland	  and	  Germany,	  present	  an	  interesting	  contrast.	  A	  test	  of	  the	  Irish	  public’s	  perception	  of	  indivisibility	  came	  with	  a	  2012	  referendum	  on	  the	  Fiscal	  Compact,	  a	  treaty	  among	  25	  member	  states	  that	  further	  empowers	  the	  EU	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  national	  governments	  in	  budgeting.	  Given	  not	  only	  the	  hardships	  of	  austerity	  the	  Irish	  were	  experiencing	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  rescue	  program	  but	  also	  their	  history	  of	  rejecting	  EU	  treaties,	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  they	  supported	  the	  treaty	  with	  a	  60	  percent	  majority.	  This	  suggests	  a	  convergence	  of	  opinion	  with	  the	  Irish	  political	  elites,	  who	  campaigned	  for	  the	  treaty	  based	  on	  economic	  necessity.	  By	  contrast,	  Germans	  experienced	  the	  biggest	  single	  increase	  in	  the	  perceived	  gap	  between	  the	  national	  and	  European	  economies	  after	  2009.	  This	  large	  gap	  is	  unsurprising	  due	  to	  the	  relative	  health	  of	  the	  German	  economy	  compared	  to	  countries	  receiving	  European	  rescues—a	  situation	  that	  also	  applies	  to	  Sweden	  and	  Denmark.	  But	  it	  also	  reflects	  a	  persistent	  gap	  between	  political	  elites	  and	  the	  public	  in	  Germany	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  “interdependence	  rationale”	  for	  supranational	  macroeconomic	  management	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  (Fogarty	  &	  Wallsten	  2013).	  	  
European	  Parliament	  election	  results,	  2004-­2014	  How	  do	  these	  observations	  of	  economic	  indivisibility	  map	  onto	  election	  results	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (see	  Table	  4)?	  Again,	  interpretation	  at	  this	  stage	  must	  be	  done	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  caution,	  but	  a	  few	  observations	  are	  possible.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  observation	  suggests	  a	  variant	  on	  the	  “contact	  hypothesis”:	  the	  longer	  Europeans	  are	  exposed	  to	  EU	  (and	  perhaps	  euro	  area)	  authority,	  the	  more	  aware	  of	  their	  common	  economic	  fate	  they	  become.	  
	   13	  
Table	  4.	  Vote	  percentages	  for	  mainstream	  parties	  in	  European	  elections,	  2004-­2014	  	   	   2004	   	   2009	   	   2014	  EU13	   	   81.7	   	   79.9	   	   69.4	  Belgium	   85	   	   86.2	   	   86.4	  Bulgaria	   n/a	   	   73.6	   	   88.3	  Czech	  Rep.	   32.7	   	   32.2	   	   60.0	  Denmark	   77.7	   	   77.6	   	   65.3	  Germany	   86.5	   	   83.6	   	   79.5	  Estonia	   84.5	   	   91.4	   	   87.4	   	  Ireland	   72.1	   	   69.0	   	   54.8	   	  Greece	  	   77.1	   	   74.5	   	   42.0	  Spain	   	   90.6	   	   93.2	   	   62.1	   	  France	  	   71.5	   	   69.1	   	   53.6	   	  Italy	   	   75.1	   	   84.9	   	   68.4	  Cyprus	   52.2	   	   52.1	   	   46.8	   	  Latvia	   	   56.4	   	   56.1	   	   76.6	   	  Lithuania	   72.8	   	   57.7	   	   58.7	  Luxembourg	   89.1	   	   86.3	   	   78.9	  Hungary	   94.8	   	   81.2	   	   78.9	  Malta	   	   97.5	   	   96.9	   	   96.4	  Netherlands	   80.2	   	   64.3	   	   58.9	  Austria	   78.9	   	   63.7	   	   73.7	  Poland	  	   40.8	   	   66.2	   	   52.3	  Portugal	   77.8	   	   66.6	   	   81.2	  Romania	   n/a	   	   88.4	   	   77.3	  Slovenia	   88.0	   	   86.5	   	   69.1	  Slovakia	   66.7	   	   83.8	   	   66.2	  Finland	   84.4	   	   78.3	   	   75.9	  Sweden	   70.6	   	   78.0	   	   75.6	  UK	   	   71.9	   	   39.6	   	   41	  	  A	  first	  observation	  is	  that,	  overall,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  some	  correlation	  between	  trends	  in	  indivisibility	  and	  voting	  for	  mainstream	  parties.	  The	  vote	  percentage	  for	  mainstream	  parties	  was	  relatively	  unchanged	  (and	  increased	  slightly	  in	  many	  countries)	  from	  2004	  to	  2009,	  during	  a	  period	  in	  which	  indivisibility	  was	  increasing	  (see	  Table	  3).	  One	  major	  exception	  to	  this	  trend	  was	  the	  UK,	  whose	  pro-­‐EU	  party	  vote	  declined	  less	  as	  a	  result	  of	  voter	  choices	  than	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Party’s	  defection	  from	  the	  mainstream	  EPP	  to	  the	  Euroskeptic	  ECR.	  Alternatively,	  the	  2014	  European	  elections	  brought	  higher	  vote	  tallies	  to	  Euroskeptic	  parties	  during	  a	  period	  in	  which	  indivisibility	  broadly	  declined	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  	  Second,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Bulgaria	  and	  the	  UK,	  the	  countries	  in	  which	  the	  vote	  percentage	  of	  mainstream	  parties	  increased	  in	  2014—Belgium,	  Czech	  Republic,	  Latvia,	  Lithuania,	  Austria,	  and	  Portugal—had	  increasing	  or	  comparatively	  high	  indivisibility.	  While	  this	  is	  too	  tenuous	  a	  relationship	  to	  draw	  real	  conclusions	  from,	  it	  does	  seem	  to	  support	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Vote	  percentages	  are	  for	  the	  EU25	  in	  2004,	  EU27	  in	  2009,	  and	  EU28	  in	  2014.	  
mainstream	  parties/groups	  EPP,	  PES,	  ELDR/ALDE,	  EGP,	  EFA,	  EDP	  	  left	  Euroskeptic	  parties/groups	  PEL,	  GUE/NGL	  	  right	  Euroskeptic	  parties/groups	  ECR/AECR,	  EFD/EFDD,	  AEN	  	  not	  included	  NI	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first	  observation	  of	  a	  possible	  positive	  correlation	  between	  indivisibility	  and	  pro-­‐EU	  party	  voting—and	  thus	  the	  “solidarity”	  version	  of	  the	  indivisibility	  proposition.	  	  That	  said,	  other	  observations	  suggest	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  caution	  in	  drawing	  conclusions.	  Several	  countries	  with	  high	  or	  increasing	  levels	  of	  indivisibility—including	  Estonia,	  Ireland,	  Finland,	  Italy,	  France,	  Poland,	  and	  Spain—saw	  declines	  in	  support	  for	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  in	  2014.	  Meanwhile,	  stable	  support	  for	  mainstream	  parties	  in	  Germany—consistent	  with	  the	  re-­‐election	  of	  Angela	  Merkel’s	  center-­‐right-­‐led	  coalition	  in	  September	  2013—contrasts	  with	  the	  big	  decrease	  in	  Germans’	  perceived	  indivisibility	  from	  2009	  to	  2014.	  More	  generally,	  initial	  scatterplots	  with	  data	  points	  for	  all	  twenty-­‐seven	  EU	  members	  suggest	  something	  close	  to	  the	  expected	  positive	  relationship	  between	  indivisibility	  and	  pro-­‐EU	  party	  vote	  in	  the	  2009	  election,	  but	  no	  obvious	  correlation	  in	  the	  2014	  elections.	  	  Though	  more	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  is	  required	  before	  more	  confident	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn,	  it	  seems	  that	  indivisibility	  in	  itself	  has	  some	  effect	  but	  not	  one	  that	  is	  manifestly	  powerful	  or	  consistent	  across	  countries.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  Like	  Robert	  Schuman	  more	  than	  sixty	  years	  earlier,	  former	  European	  Commission	  President	  Jacques	  Delors	  expressed	  a	  certain	  vision	  of	  collective	  action:	  I	  give	  real	  importance	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  “wanting	  to	  live	  together”…Accepting	  interdependence	  is	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  this	  “wanting	  to	  act	  together,”	  which	  itself	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  “wanting	  to	  live	  together.”	  (Delors	  2012:	  177)	  As	  a	  quintessential	  European	  political	  elite,	  Delors’	  vision	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  expected	  elite	  rationale	  for	  European	  management	  of	  interdependence.	  Yet	  this	  vision	  goes	  beyond	  a	  mere	  technocratic	  rationale	  for	  EU	  collective	  action:	  it	  aims	  to	  connect	  economic	  interdependence	  to	  shared	  beliefs	  about	  common	  fate.	  	  This	  paper	  represents	  an	  initial	  attempt	  to	  examine	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  public	  beliefs	  in	  economic	  common	  fate—i.e.,	  of	  indivisibility—and	  its	  relationship	  to	  support	  for	  pro-­‐EU	  parties	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  Subsequent	  iterations	  of	  the	  paper	  will	  begin	  more	  in-­‐depth	  testing	  of	  hypotheses,	  and	  will	  pay	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  interactive	  effect	  of	  indivisibility	  with	  other	  “community”	  variables—notably	  a	  sense	  of	  trust	  in	  others	  and	  identification	  with	  Europe,	  as	  per	  Ecker-­‐Ehrhardt	  (2014)	  and	  Hooghe	  &	  Marks	  (2004).	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